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DDCI ADMIRAL BOBBY R. INMAN

REMARKS TO EMPLOYEES

HEADQUARTERS AUDITORIUM

30 April 1982

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Good afternoon to you. I'm sorry to see that there are people standing. I really haven't had a problem of attendance at these gatherings on the rare occasions when I've been permitted to do them, but I really didn't feel I needed to whip up as much publicity and interest in getting people here for this one as we turned out to have.

For those who are reasonably astute observers of the local scene, and if you read the confirmation testimony very carefully, there were some seeds planted then for what I had hoped would be a quiet departure somewhere between eighteen months and two years into the tour. I was reluctant to undertake an additional assignment in the end of 1980, early 1981, frankly from a sense that I was already tiring of heavy bureaucratic battles which seemed to go on endlessly in this city. And that I have found working in the intelligence process an enormously satisfying evolution that it was better to leave while that was the overriding sensation rather than one of irritation and weariness with the petty side of life. I acceded to come for a period of time. I have no regrets about doing that. I leave with lots of wonderful memories. But also I've reached the conclusion that it really was time to get on with my time schedule to do other fresh things. There's never a good time to schedule departure when you're in one of these jobs. In looking at the real problem which was getting a successor in place, getting the decision-making to continue without any hitches, with getting on with the execution of some very vital things that are ahead for this Community.

It's clearly much better to let that change take place just before the

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decisions are made on the '84 budget. In order that the DDCI, who's going to have to defend the decisions in the Congress, will be the central figure in making the decisions, at least in making the recommendations to the DCI. And that was what ultimately set the timing of when the best time was to make the change. And there was also a strong sense on my part that the earlier rather than later made it more likely that there would be a professional following in my place. I'm sorry John was tied up otherwise, because I had planned for my opening line for this session to say, "I take great pleasure in introducing to you the new Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. John McMahon." I'm sorry he's not here, but I do it anyway with enormous pleasure.

As I look at the status of the Intelligence Community, of CIA as a part of that Community, I would tell you that I depart with a great deal of optimism about where you are and the future that lies out ahead. We have laid out a road map for rebuilding this whole Intelligence Community, all parts of it. There are some things that are yet to be defined. There are still some priorities to be argued about, but there is a commitment in the Executive Branch. It waivers every now and again and it takes a little propping up, but it's fundamentally in place.

And there's the strong constituency in Congress, though they're a little staggered at the front loading and the size of the percentage increase they're being asked to sign up for in '83. But if you work at it smoothly and with calmness and with the effort to explain in terms they can understand, I have great confidence that we will in fact proceed over the next six or seven years to give this country an absolute unparalleled intelligence capability. I regret to say I'm afraid the decade out ahead of us is going

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to require every bit of that and that you're likely to find it a very stressing time dealing with a great many problems all over the world.

To get ready for that beyond just the routine of getting billets, getting resources, buying equipment, you need to give your absolute first attention to people; to acquiring people to ensuring that you're using them in absolutely the best ways; to be sure that the training you undertake is designed not for the easiest way to do it, but to get the most out of it in the least period of time for those who are involved; that there are viable career tracks; that that concern for the long range career for all employees comes across and cuts across all the bureaucratic issues; that you pay attention to those who are interested in coming so that they know from the very first moment that you care about getting the best quality and therefore you take the extra measures to make sure they know from the outset that you're interested in their welfare and their joining; and that you work at sustaining those who are here. If I have any latent concern out of my time, it's that there may not always be enough concern by all the organizations for the people, and for ensuring that the organization itself works hard at making sure they know there is a future for them and it's a future based on performance and nothing else.

Now rather than my lecturing at you for the lengthy period of time they've got earmarked for us, I'd rather fall back on the approach I've used for each of these and that's to discuss what's on your mind. So the floor's opened for questions and I will once again give you the usual line, there are no questions that are out of bounds, but there are some answers that may be. So I do this with great comfort. No, I'm serious, that part wasn't supposed to be funny, the other part was.

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I have watched this organization from afar and close for a long period of time and I used to see Notes from the Director and I would often read them in the press before I ever got a copy to see. And I have been personally, enormously pleased that from the sessions we've had when we've talked, I have never read about anything I've had to say in the press. So as I answer my questions to you today, I'm doing it with the confidence that that same approach will apply. Who wants to be first?

Q ...seeking another career... What kind of career is an Intelligence Officer like yourself finding...?

A Well, I'm being told that having placed all those page one want ads that a fair response could be expected. Having thought about this process for a long time, a combination of a military career and an expectation once I did commit to career status that I would do about 30 years of government service, all things being equal, that I would like to do something in a following career that would be totally different simply for challenge, for dealing with fresh problems and being certain, as I said to the Newspaper Publishers, that I would find bureaucracies in the civilian world as well that would irritate me, but at least, hopefully, fresh ones and fresh problems. I have enormously enjoyed a couple of jobs where I have been privileged to run large organizations with reasonably complex organizational structures with pretty good-sized budgets and sizeable numbers of employees with some research and development involvement, with some procurement involvement, with large operating elements with pretty good product lines. The kinds of things that said if the right opportunity came in the corporate world to run something, it would be fun to try to see if the same techniques that have worked at least reasonably well some of the time in this career field

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are transferable to others. If they are, I'll tell all the rest of you intelligence professionals that there's some hope. If there's not, I'm afraid that may be very visible to you very quickly. There are a lot of other offers that have come along, to consult, sit on boards of directors, the competition among the lecture bureaus to get me out on the lecture circuit clearly comes out of all this publicity and hopefully they will fade away as quickly. Though if I were inclined to ever pick up on that, it would be because I concluded that I could work helpfully for this Intelligence Community by continuing to build a constituency for it in the outside world. I will not have lost my interest in what I've spent 30 years doing by simply crossing over to a different profession. I recognize that it is not likely to be as exciting. I had an experience 10 years ago when I got a year's break of going off to the National War College. The first six weeks were very sobering and sort of difficult for my ego--the telephone didn't ring and the world got along perfectly well without me. And I'm sure the watch officers will get by without my Saturday or Sunday evening call asking them what's gone on in the last few hours. But one has to recognize that if you've really been interested in the substance and the process of this Intelligence Community for a long period of time, there will indeed be withdrawal symptoms when you leave that.

Q Admiral Inman, I think it would be particularly valuable to have your appraisal of Congress upon leaving and its attitude toward the Intelligence Community. I'm particularly interested in whether you see any reversion to the old attitude of not wanting to share in responsibility for some of the knowledge that goes with the operations and so forth. And then also I'd like to ask about their ability to absorb a lot of the detail that you are

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giving to that.

A In 1972, I was pulled out of the intelligence business to spend a year and a half as Executive Assistant to the Navy's Vice Chief, and one of the things I did on a daily basis there was to look at the Congressional account --how did the Navy Department deal with the Congress; when did they do it well; when did they do it poorly? There always seemed to be more of the latter than the former, but it was an instructive period on how the Congress works, how one can get them to be more responsive and more interested in your problems. I came back in September 1974 to be the Director of Naval Intelligence, very euphoric as a new flag officer coming back to the job that I thought was going to be the pinnacle of my service career. Two months later a great deal of the luster disappeared when the Church Committee got underway and I went through a course in Congressional relations during the time of the Church and Pike Committees as many of you did. But I applied a lot of the things that I had observed from that earlier time frame that it was worth spending the time to read the files to absorb the data to understand it myself before I turned to deal with the Congress. Secondly, that time spent talking to the staff was not wasted time, it was time well spent particularly if you could persuade them of the point of view that you wanted to get across. It rarely substituted for talking with the Members of Congress themselves, but it was a fundamental step in getting there. And that the most difficult thing in dealing with Members of Congress was to have thought through what I wanted to convey and to do it quickly, concisely in language they understood. That was reasonably successful. And out of those reports, the Office of Naval Intelligence got a few compliments and not much else, happily. Some of my colleagues, at least in the Defense

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Department who didn't see fit to give the same amount of time to the problem, got a great deal of criticism and they were inclined to find all kinds of other reasons to explain their difficulties. But I remain persuaded to this day that it was not any special genius or anything else. It was in fact time and work spent thinking through how one conveyed responses to their questions. Through a series of jobs that followed, I found it entirely doable to both meet their needs and to meet my concerns about security. When the permanent committees were being established, we were all extraordinarily fortunate that Senator Dan Inouye was the first permanent Chairman. And he set out to do two things--to create a security system for handling material that was better than the one in the Executive Branch and to establish a bipartisan approach in the Committees for dealing with intelligence with the fundamental understanding that intelligence must be nonpartisan. It must not have a partisan flavor. He was very strongly supported in that by Senator Goldwater as the Vice Chairman, and on balance, if one looks back, we had four very good years of that. The House picked up a fair amount of the pattern. The staffs have changed, the Members have changed, all the changes have not been positive ones, but we have an oversight process that works. We are never going to get the relief we need on things like Freedom of Information unless we have oversight that is completely credible to the public and they're going to ask the Congress if it's credible, not the Executive Branch, and we must never lose sight of that. You can't have it all. If you're going to get the manpower and resources to do the job we need to do, you're going to have to have their support. And to get that support, you're going to have to tell them what they need to know and explain to them why they really don't want to know other details if you think they ought not

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to have it. To get into a mold where you are reluctant to deal with them or to get into fights over issues or micromanagement or the rest of it, in my judgment is an utter waste of time and energy and will only lead us down a road where we will end up once again with ineffective oversight and in turn ineffective support for the rebuilding. The key is to insist from our side on a bipartisan approach to the problem to make sure we play absolutely no favorites, that if we have concerns about security, legitimate concerns about security, that we take it immediately to the Chairman and the Vice Chairman together. And when that's been done, the results have always been satisfactory. And when that's not been done, for whatever reason, the results have always been substantially less satisfying. The Congressmen do feel the heat. They don't get any credit with the voters, at least thus far they don't, for service on those oversight committees. They get restless if they have Presidential ambitions, that they later will be holding the bag for some activity that turns out to have disapproval from the voting public. That's again when you go back to the Chairman and the Vice Chairman and lay out a problem if you're having one in handling the information which is there. But if I have any strong message to leave with you, it's that you've got to work constantly at ensuring Congress knows enough to do its oversight job about how you do your business, that they know enough about your needs and your failures and your shortfalls to understand where you need help, whether that help is in people, in dollars, in relief from grade-point ceilings. They also need to know enough to be the most informed Members of Congress on the Hill on substantive matters to be able to shape the views of their colleagues because we do have a shared form of government. And we in the Intelligence Community do not publish substantive intelligence only

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for the needs of the Executive Branch. We're in the business of providing this government, all of its parts, the best quality intelligence we can possibly give them. So I could not more strongly underline my sense of the approach you need to take and the challenge you have before you in doing that. And I think you will find that you will get a very positive response. You're always going to have an occasional arrogant Member and a substantial number of staffers and that at least some of those will have some experience in this business and then conclude they automatically know more than any of us about its problems or where it ought to go. If you've raised teenagers, that will help from learning the patience in dealing with them. But patience and calmness in dealing with it directly, rather than looking for the sky to fall in, is the answer.

Q What role will we see in covert action in the next couple of years?

A I'm glad you're asking the easy questions today. The question was what role do I see for covert action in the future. I believe we have a very strong bipartisan support for giving this country the kind of quality foreign intelligence capability it needs. For a variety of sad bureaucratic misadventures we do not yet have the same support of the quality of counter-intelligence that's needed, but that's going to evolve. And I'm reasonably comfortable that we will address needs and capabilities and not organizational questions, or at least not let those drive getting on with sizing the counter-intelligence activity that needs to be done by this country and having strong public support for that, strong Congressional support for it which is the first principle in getting the public support. Covert action is going to be much tougher to ever achieve any kind of consensus on what ought to be done. My own view is that it's possible to get a public consensus on positive

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foreign intelligence and it's possible to get a consensus on counter-intelligence. I personally don't think it's likely that you would get a consensus on covert action, you just can't discuss it enough.

In that area, I'm inclined to say don't try. There it's got to be the dialogue between the Executive Branch and the Congress and there is the greatest hazard of getting drawn into partisan responses if one does not deal with that problem very carefully. I think you can get just the broadest bipartisan support that the use of covert action to raise the cost for the Soviets for their use of military force whether their own or proxies outside their territory, we'll just draw the strongest support. When you move to try to use covert action as a means to beef up action where diplomacy is failing or where you're unwilling to take the risks inherent on a great power in using its military force, you're always going to have strong disagreements about the wisdom of it. I have had some concerns about covert action, but they're not at all the ones that have been alluded to in the press. Mine are an entirely different one. I believe you do the greatest danger to an organization when you stretch it beyond its reasonable capabilities and expectations of performance. This country had a very large capability to undertake covert action in the early '60s. It was dismantled for a series of reasons, and it was drawn down to something like about 8% of the capability in dedicated assets that it had had twenty years before. And my overriding worry is that the Agency will be asked to undertake more than it has the manpower to undertake successfully. And when you get stretched beyond that which you can do successfully, then the risk for mistakes gets higher. And if the mistake is made, you're not likely to find a lot of support outside, suddenly it's the Agency's fault if the mistakes were made.

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So the leadership is going to have its challenges in ensuring that they say we are stretched as thinly as it's safe to do in trying to accomplish that which is on the plate. And we must be relieved before more is added. That's never very popular, that's not a popular approach to take around 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, but to ensure the long-term health of this Agency, it's going to be necessary.

Q Your warnings about the leakage of American technology to the other side have not been universally understood. Perhaps you weren't using language that certain scientists could understand. What would you advise us to do now that you're leaving?

A Well hopefully you can take a low profile. The problem is that the press hasn't been willing to accept that anybody who wears a uniform and occupies a high office is stupid enough to get out and speak on his own on topics that bother him when he believes other segments of society ought to be considering those problems. I will continue to have some things to say on that topic when I have gone onto my private sector endeavors and perhaps at that point you will not see the headlines "CIA SAYS" or "CIA IS TRYING TO MAKE PROBLEMS." For those who may not know how all this came about, a year ago I was asked by the American Association for the Advancement of Science if I would be willing to appear at a symposium in January 1982 and publicly make the case for secrecy. No one ever wants to do it. They'd asked a number of other people who had declined, and I thought it was something that needed to be done. I see it as part of the overall fabric that has to be put together if one's going to get relief from Freedom of Information Act eventually. But I did undertake to do it as an individual. I was still Director of

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NSA at the time. The statement itself at the '82 symposium is a rather mild restatement of views I had previously given with some elaboration about our growing understanding of the full scope of the Soviet successes in acquiring technology from the west, particularly from this country, and suggested that the scientific community needed to start worrying about that themselves. When I was the Director of NSA, the Agency was greatly alarmed at the public discussions of public cryptography and there were influential segments in the Agency who believed that was going to do irreparable damage to their collection capabilities. And after one of the stories, just don't stand there, do something; so something I did was to go out and give a speech and start a dialogue and there was great deal of apprehension inside about the idea of a Director talking in public on intelligence issues. But, we saw it through and the American Council on Education agreed to play the role of an honest broker. Government went forward with all kinds of ideas about how to deal with the problem. The academicians who'd gathered began by throwing out every idea the Government had and coming up with some very good ideas on their own. And those ideas have been tried. I don't know that they have made major strides in reducing the potential dangers of public discussion of public cryptography, but it's done a fantastic job of easing the concern inside NSA about the damage that would be done by publications and that in itself is no small accomplishment. So my sense again here was one needed to get the scientists to think about this issue before the other branches of Government got around to offering regulations. Your chore in this one is the one you're well embarked on. Yours is not the role to establish regulations, your role is to do the best job you possibly can on understanding what the Soviets are acquiring, how they're

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acquiring it, what they're doing with it. And ensuring that you articulate that knowledge and your estimates of where it's going to go in ways that are so clear that the policymakers can't ignore it and have to come to grips with trying to deal with it. You can't tell them how to deal with it. You really can't tell Defense and Agriculture and Commerce how to deal with industry in the academic world. Though they may occasionally ask you for a little advice, you would be better served to give them the advice in private rather than public; I would tell you from my own experience. But it's an important topic that's been around and like so many other topics it's an area where so little attention has been paid for a decade. No one was asking for an analysis of it. They competed with resources to do other things, but in looking at the kinds of problems we need to deal with if we're going to meet the competition from the Soviets in the decade ahead, it's a critically important area.

Q You spoke about the rebuilding programs of the future and personnel problems, could you give us your views on how you stand on the personnel systems in this Community, on the organizing of personnel systems. At NSA you had one system for handling the integration of military and civilians; in the Navy you had another one for the civilians separate from the military; and here we have several career services.

A I'm happy to see the questions continue to be easy ones. I noted my general view on this topic with my last points in my formal remarks because I remain persuaded that you can buy all kinds of equipment, you can buy all kinds of marvelous sensors; but people are, certainly in this business at least, the difference. And whether an organization becomes bureaucratic or whether it's outward looking depends on a number of features, but the

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approach to personnel and their careers and their futures plays at least a significant role in that prospect. You cannot expect people to go out and take adventures on their own, to try different approaches or different ways to broaden themselves if in fact the existing structures for deciding how you acquire, how you train, how you promote, how you assign people do not work to facilitate that. There are many things about the Navy Department that I look back on and criticize freely. The one thing that does stand out is an absolutely outstanding personnel system. You know it's awfully hard to get rid of the factor of friendships and the rest, but it comes as close to being a system of total fairness based on absolute equitable opportunity for all and decisions made on performance of any system that I have encountered. NSA's system had its problems also. There is an innate nature I have found in all the organizations of where I've been to put the greatest emphasis on how the personnel system serves the organization and minimizing its responsibilities for how it serves the individuals. At NSA, because there was a single system for the civilian personnel, it was possible without a great deal of difficulty, to spend a fair amount of effort working on long-range career development. It had also been possible to do that and I held onto it for about 7 years, the same thing within the Naval intelligence specialty. I found at NSA that I did not have the mechanisms to influence the military personnel systems for the other services and so as I look back on pluses and minuses, I was never able to make any impact at all on the personnel process of the other military services and the people they had in the SIGINT system. In looking at the approach here, it will be no great surprise to many here that I would have been willing to undertake the turbulence of a total overhaul into a single personnel system.

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But it was the collective judgment of the senior leadership that the turbulence to be encountered was not worth the projected gain. So then the question becomes, how do you optimize the system which you have. I believe some real improvements are still necessary in looking to broaden the experience and opportunity of the employees of this great Agency. I have had the same exact experience here that I had at NSA and that I had at ONI that I can tell within a very short period of time when someone has looked at this Agency from outside it from working with it. And you simply see the needs and what you can do in a different light when you've had that experience. And I believe the systems need to be drawn to work much harder at encouraging people at various stages to broaden their perspective from different parts of the Agency, from outside the Agency and they must always know they're welcomed back as long as they remain strong high performers. And in my sampling around the Agency I have found too many youngsters who are very reluctant to take that opportunity for a broadening tour out of a perception, however untrue it may be, but a perception that if they venture out, they may not be able to come back to their career field. And I think over the long term for building the next generation of leaders, that's a point that needs to be addressed head-on.

Q           You were quoted this week, I don't know whether accurately or not, that you believed the Intelligence Community was marginally capable of meeting the challenges of the '80s and '90s [BRI: of the late '80s and '90s] and also I believe you chose not to take a position on the question of what was the best intelligence organization in the world. Do you want to elaborate on either of those?

A           I described for the American Newspaper Publishers Association my view

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of the kind of world we're going to have to deal with in the late '80s and '90s, that it would not just be worrying about the Soviet Union on the Eurasian land mass, but that in fact we were going to be in a period of great stress, of great competition for raw materials, natural resources, markets all over the world, that we were going to be dealing with unstable regimes whose actions directly affected our interest and those of our allies all over the world. I then went on to give my judgment that currently the major threat to the country's survival is indication and warning of strategic attacks--surprise attack. So you know I thought we were in outstanding condition. Absolutely first-rate at it. It would take a series of massive failures to impact on that. That our general understanding of Soviet military capabilities and the likelihood of their using their forces outside their own borders and of their forces, not proxies, and of the general state of readiness and training was excellent. That we suffered though we were doing substantially better than we did several years ago, but that we still suffered in the scientific and technical arena in not knowing enough soon enough about what we were going to have to face in years down the way. And that the toughest of all the problems with the principal adversary was simply the political equation, the leadership, what they thought, where they would go. That was simply one we had to keep working harder at but with no certainty at all that we would be any more successful against it. That on the economic side, our performance was spotty, where we had resources applied the performance slowly was going from good to excellent. There were a lot of other areas where there was minimal coverage and that as one moved away from concern about the principal adversary, that our coverage in depth was so thin on so many parts of the world that we were only marginally prepared

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to deal with the world I envisioned us having to deal with in the last half of the decade. And that we could not afford to draw down from the efforts on the principal problem to deal with those, so that's why their rebuilding program was critical to the country's long-term health. I also made the point, maybe not in that gathering but in a couple others on this trip, in response to questions of my absolute conviction, drawn out of the days of being an analyst, that you can never be dependent on a single source. And therefore it's critical to try to work for having a human source and SIGINT, human source and Imagery, SIGINT and Imagery, delightfully all three on everything you've got to address. And that allowing yourself to depend on a single means of access was absolutely foolhardy. That we did indeed have strong relationships with many of our friends based on treaties growing out of World War II collaboration, but that in this fast-moving world we had to have independent knowledge and capability on every problem that might come along because when the crisis came we could not wait to tap somebody else's data base to be able to deal with it. I chose not to deal with the question of the strongest or best organization in that forum simply from a sense one, I didn't want to give any encouragement to the other side; on the other hand, I didn't want to impact on the support I was trying to generate. There is no doubt in my mind that the potential for being best lies right here. That potential is not always realized. As an outsider having been privileged to transit through, the impact of the '70s is visible to me and again these may be perceptions more than facts, but it is not at all unusual that an organization under attack constantly being drawn down in its resources turns inward and becomes bureaucratic. And that turf protection and worrying about relative position becomes the first measuring

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stick in dealing with every problem. I think I see a lot of very good signs of that being thrown off but I don't think it's totally gone at all. And I think that is what, probably more than anything else, that is going to make the difference in whether this organization really regains its full potential in the decade out ahead. If I've any challenge to offer it is to get rid of any dialogue, any discussion, any consideration about the relative position of this organization as compared to other elements of the Intelligence Community. The focus has to be not on position. It has to be on being best and that's not the first time you've heard it from me, but I could not leave a more stronger challenge or one that I think is more central to the degree of success in building for the future. That always tends to dampen the hands when I deal with that.

Q One of the biggest challenges, thinking about today versus thirty years ago when I came in is thinking about two things--discussing here focus on the individual and his career development and concern for him and his career development plan; what you want to do and what the Agency wants you to do should coincide, that's ideal. But we also understood quite clearly that if there is a conflict between the two the interest of the institution comes first. And there wasn't anybody who felt differently about that. I've talked to you a number of times about the experience I've had with my own kids who represent essentially three different generations. We aren't the same institution having come through the '70s that we were in the '50s. We do in fact have to pay a lot more attention to the cultural shift on the outside and it's ridiculous to look in the mirror and say that the good old days should be returned. But I'm particularly troubled on how to deal with that

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individual desire in that institutional context. And one of the things I feel strongly that we've lost in the past eight years during the investigative period afterwards is the sense of discipline. And I would love to hear you give us some counsel on how you might help us regain some of that.

A        Discipline has to begin with a sense of purpose by the individual themselves, a sense that what they're doing is important and that discipline is critical to the success of what they're about. And there have been some discouraging downsides visible in this fifteen months. Having employees call Congressional Committees to encourage them to write letters attacking a performance of another Agency employee who was present on the podium. The occasional caller's comments to members of the media about problems inside. One's never going to be able to totally deal with, successfully, the question of the individual who feels abused by the organization, but some of these are clearly not out of that. I'm persuaded that you can attack even in the '80s the problem of improving both the sense of purpose and the discipline if it is clear that you build a long-range system to look to where you want to see people five, eight years, ten years from now. Involve them in it themselves, but tie it to a performance evaluation that has their complete confidence in its fairness. They won't all like the results, but the sense that all have that it's absolutely fair and impartial is critical to the success of any such approach. If one looks at the needs of the Agency only from the needs of an individual career service, then I don't think as a personal view that you're ever going to be as responsive to the aspirations of the career force as it's really feasible for the Agency to be. I would also tell you my own sense is that we are now picking up with the finest members out of a new generation. Those who have a lot of the same

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basic approaches that are very familiar to me from the early '50s as that clock's gone around. Hardworking, a little less sense of the pure material side of the problem, but very keen to have early job satisfaction. Very sensitive if they feel their time's being wasted by idling through things in the early stage of their presence. But most of all, uncertain about their future, what's going to be available to them. And while they're still in the applicant stage, if it takes them two months to get some indication of interest, if it takes them two weeks after they've passed the medical exam until the papers are transited and they're told formally that they've passed the exam and I could go on with a litany of others that I found from asking both successful applicants and those who tired and went away. That there is a basic attitude of caring about people and displaying that quickly isn't in basic conflict with institutional needs. The institution all across the board has gotten a little sloppy about showing that it really does care. Even less hands. Are there any I'm missing?

Q        Would you comment further on how you think the counterintelligence, the national counterintelligence effort could be improved from this point?

A        I bring a conviction to the counterintelligence arena that I brought to the foreign intelligence side that this country has major problems in its performance of that mission. And the root cause or resources applied to the problem at a time that the challenges have expanded exponentially, the people applied to it have been steadily drawn down. And that a major infusion over a long period of time of manpower, of the machinery that will facilitate doing the job better is the essential element. Too often I have seen repeated administrations eager to reorganize as the way to paper over

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personnel shortfalls. And I felt very strongly in this case that one should not start out with an organizational response until one had faced up to and addressed what you have been willing to apply in the way of resources against a burgeoning problem. Once that's done, if there then is a corporate view that there are better ways to manage and to flow that knowledge and to analyze it, I would have no problem with those being addressed. I think what one will find is that there certainly is not a need to change basic organization. You may want to relocate activities within an organization in part of the beefing up process, but creating a whole new organization or a whole new supervisory mechanism is not necessary and ultimately is not wise. One always has to worry about idle hands not being fully employed. But we have tried in this country earlier the process of establishing new liaison mechanisms at the White House to replace institutional cooperation. I don't need to repeat for this group what happened in that last experience, and I would not care to see us embark down that road again. I'm not in this process saying that we're already doing the best job we could do with what we have. I've not examined it closely enough to be able to make a sound judgment in that regard, but I have examined it closely enough to be absolutely certain that there are far too few people and far too little support to it to do the kind of quality job that needs to be done.

Q One thing that's always concerned me when we've talked and you've talked--building resources, building strength, adding resources. I already see a problem with the policy of decisionmaking, absorbing what we already have. How do you see that problem?

A I think the problem is getting increasingly complex for them, but I also see automation offering you a lot of opportunities to help deal with

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that. When you have fewer people you try to make a single product satisfy everybody's need. As this rebuilding gets underway and is increasingly successful, I think you will need to have liaison people out permanently present in much of the user organization, tending to the exact needs of individuals and giving them products tailored to their needs in dealing with their current problem. And when we finally get the automation in at twice the price and a year later, that will do the job we need to be done. We will be very glad we have it and it will permit us to do precisely that kind of job, but ultimately, the great responsibility will fall on the analyst in sorting out what they provide. And I believe one should indeed open as many access ports from as many disciplines and ways on the widest range of topics that we possibly can get for getting information to flow down to us. And then rely on their training, their breadth of experience, their skills in giving to the user the information that will be useful in the form that they can absorb. I do not believe the way to solve the problem is by cutting off access right at the start and I've seen recently some papers written early in the '70s describing our problem as being that we're collecting too much information and there you can find the root causes of how we got in this mess we're in now. Rather than making the case this country is a world power. Hopefully it's going to be one for a long time to come in the future and we have to address what might the policymakers, the decisionmakers, the implementers need to know and to develop the data base that will let us be responsive to that and to lead them in the direction they need to know. You people are going to have to be pretty adventurous in that process. We haven't yet sorted it out as well as I think we ought to, how we access and use information that's available in open sources. The

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organization as part of this career development process has to make available more educational opportunities, more travel opportunities in attacking the quality part of the problem. Emphasis on language skills. It's a big problem, it's going to get much larger. Managing it is going to present a lot of challenges, but doing it successfully is absolutely key to your being the best intelligence organization in the best Intelligence Community that the world has seen.

Q Are we going to get any relief from FOIA?

A Iffy. I dealt with it head-on with the American Newspaper Publishers Association. I won't say that they were enthralled by my arguments, but my sense from a number of the publishers afterwards was that we did indeed have a case for some relief and the argument's increasingly going to be on how one defines that relief. We have espoused hard the position of total exclusion. Ultimately we're going to have to make some judgments, you're going to have to make some judgments, over whether waiting for full exclusion is worth the time as opposed to getting some earlier relief from something like the Chafee Bill which has been opposed, which at least would provide very strong relief on questions of sources and methods. I'm reasonably comfortable that we will have an Identities bill by mid-summer. Had we gotten it earlier, we might've gotten some action on FOIA this year. It's now probably going to be in the next session. But there's a constituency out there that's willing to work with you on this and a critical feature is for the Agency to continue to talk with things like the Freedom of Information Committee of the American Newspaper Publishers Association and other bodies. The fact that the ACLU is very concerned that it's going to be approved is likely the best news that in fact we will get some relief. The

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question is simply how long it takes and what the form of it will be. One more? They're two more.

Q ... is the...author...capabilities planning and budgeting.  
Can you give us a prognosis of its success on the Hill?

A The Congress, where it counts, has been very receptive to a long-range capabilities approach. They're a little staggered at the twenty-five plus percent growth this year, but we're going to get most of that. Frankly they're pleased that for the first time they're seeing where this is going to go. And the Executive Branch still hasn't quite awakened to what happened in there where there was a great desire to only tell them a year at a time so that power resided a few miles down the road before parceling that out. There's a commitment now to a long-range rebuilding. And I can assure you next year those Committees are going to be looking very carefully to see where are you coming down that road for rebuilding. And that's the critical reason why I encourage you to work very hard at sustaining the best relationships with the Congress you can.

Q Admiral, you spoke perhaps of speaking out on the lecture circuit if you thought it would be helpful to the Intelligence Community process. One of the things we have seen as a phenomena of an increasing number of people speaking out in the form of books and so forth, perhaps because they believed it would be helpful, but for those of us on the inside, it has been anything but, in terms of dealing with assets and so forth. Could you tell us how you would approach striking a balance in that regard as to what you might think will be helpful up against what the insider might still consider difficult to deal with.

A My own sense is that one can be helpful by educating about the process

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with general detail. You don't do that with books, but you do do it by talking to groups of people who are genuinely interested and who generally are uninformed about how we go about our business these days. And you don't need lots of exciting little examples or details. In fact, they're simply interested in the overall process and you can speak in their broad terms in doing that. The real mistake is when some people decide they just have to write a book because then the editor wants more detail and you're into a cycle. It's just bound to lead to trouble. The other area is in talking about what's happening in the outside world and in the shape of the world that one thinks we're going to have to deal with. There the interest in what one has to say probably disappears pretty quickly. In whatever I do, I will remain a great friend and a quick critic of the process. You really wouldn't want me to change after 30 years. I think on that point it's probably as well to let you break and get back to work. I would simply sum up by saying that I feel very privileged to have spent these months with you. I've learned a lot in the process. I think you've got a marvelous future out ahead of you. You really ought to have your heads up for the things you've already accomplished and for the prospects of what you'll accomplish in the future. Do your best to get rid of the bureaucratic earmarks and concentrate on being best, not being central, and work hard at keeping these constituencies going for a good Intelligence Community that's already under way. I leave very comfortable that you're going to have strong leadership as you meet these challenges and I'm even more excited about the prospect of the leadership coming along for the next generations. I would tell you I think those of you who are leading in the '80s have it very easy as compared to the challenges that are going to confront those of the '90s, so work hard at

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